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This paper investigates the potential for a further increase in trade between the fifteen old EU members and the twelve 
new countries having joined in 2004 and 2007 that results from a convergence of the new members' institutions towards 
the level of the EU-15 in accordance with the Acquis Communautaire. To this aim we estimate a gravity model 
applying both static and dynamic panel data techniques and incorporate detailed variables measuring institutional 
quality. We conclude that there is further potential for trade resulting from the successive convergence of the new 
members´ institutional framework towards EU standards. 
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The Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) by ten new mem-
bers on May 1st, 2004 and lately by Bulgaria and Romania on Jan 1st,
2007 constitutes an outstanding event in European history and brings with
it multiple implications for the old and new members' economic a®airs. In
the ¯eld of bilateral trade relations the Europe Agreements concluded be-
tween the EU and the 12 accession countries (AC-12) lead to a continuous
reduction of barriers to trade and to an integration process that culminated
in these countries entering the European Single Market simultaneously with
EU membership. By the beginning of the twenty-¯rst century, EU tari®s
on imports from the Central and Eastern European countries were almost
completely eliminated. In the beginning of this process, large unexploited
potentials in the trade volume between the EU and the Central and Eastern
European countries were estimated (Hamilton and Winters (1992), Winters
and Wang (1994), Baldwin (1994), and Faini and Portes (1995)). As a mat-
ter of fact, trade between the ¯fteen old and the twelve new members of the
EU roughly tripled between 1995 and 2004, whereas overall trade between
the EU-15 and the rest of the world experienced a growth of merely about
80% (see Figure 1). In light of this rapid growth, more recent studies from
Breuss and Egger (1999) and Piazolo (2001) argue that the trade potential
might already be exploited by now. Yet there remain informal barriers to
trade, resulting from still existing di®erences in the old and the new mem-
bers' institutional environments. Entering the EU especially brings with it
the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire, which should result in a fur-
ther reduction of any informal and more indirect barriers to trade by slowly
changing the institutional framework.
The role of institutions for economic growth and development has been
widely acknowledged (Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2001), Knack and Keefer (1995), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi
(2004)). Only lately, however, has the link between institutions and trade
become more prominent in the empirical literature. Since institutions are
bound to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange (North (1991)),
2they should be of particular relevance for international trade because of the
higher insecurity and risk compared to exchange on the national level. The
positive in°uence of high-quality institutions on bilateral trade °ows is con-
¯rmed by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and
Maurel (2004), and de Groot, Linder, Rietveld, and Subramanian (2004).
Focusing on the Central and Eastern European countries, Cheptea (2007)
¯nds a signi¯cant impact on trade with the EU through improving institu-
tions in the former countries.
Our study combines and extends the empirical literature on institutions,
trade and European integration by asking if the adjustment of the AC-12's
institutional framework to that of the EU-15 might give rise to a further
potential in trade between the old and the new member countries. To this
end we follow the methodology of the seminal studies on European trade
undertaken in the nineties and resort to the gravity model. We ¯rst es-
timate a benchmark gravity regression taking into account the commonly
used explanatory variables income, population, distance, and membership in
regional trade bloc regimes in order to quantify these basic determinants of
foreign trade °ows. In a second step we include indicators on the quality of
a country's institutions. They are part of the Index of Economic Freedom
(IEF) and contain ten single factors of economic freedom covering a wide
array of institutional aspects. We use a large country data set in order to
identify in this general setting which institutions exactly exert an in°uence
on bilateral trade °ows. This result forms the basis upon which the further
potential for trade between the EU-15 and the AC-12, resulting from a con-
vergence of the AC-12's institutional framework towards that of the EU-15,
can be calculated.
One additional feature of our study consists in the usage of econometric
speci¯cations. Although the role of history for bilateral trade °ows has been
repeatedly emphasized (see, for example, Eichengreen and Irwin (1997) and
Bun and Klaassen (2002)), dynamic panel data models have rarely been ap-
plied to gravity models. Hence, in all our regressions we not only resort to
the commonly used cross-sectional estimation methods, but also apply dy-
namic panel estimation techniques in order to explicitly incorporate changes
3over time.
We ¯nd a strong in°uence of institutions on trade, albeit on a rather
general level in the form of government activity. Highlighting the positive
role a government can play in the minimization of risks that emanate from
trade openness, exports from the EU-15 to the AC-12 could be particularly
stimulated by a growing government sector in the new member states. Im-
ports into the EU-15 could gain most from the ¯ght against corruption in the
AC-12. Here the di®erences between the old and the new EU members are
still most pronounced. On the whole, we can conclude that exports from the
old to the new countries of the EU could experience an additional impulse of
5.7% and imports of 17.9% if the institutional framework in the AC-12 was
adjusted to the average of the old member states of the EU. The dynamic
panel regressions provide evidence that history plays a role in explaining
current trade °ows, which also alludes to the in°uence of the institutional
quality obtained in the past.
The paper is structured as followed. Section 2 provides an overview of
the link between institutions and trade and illustrates the relevance of insti-
tutions for the European integration process. Section 3 discusses the gravity
model and its empirical applications as well as econometric issues. In section
4, the data are presented. The role of institutions for trade and our results
on the EU-15's trade potential with the twelve new members are reported in
section 5. We conclude with a summary of our results.
2 Institutions, trade and EU integration
Institutions, both of informal (traditions, codes of conduct) as well as of for-
mal nature (constitutions, laws, property rights), are essential for economic
transactions, since, as North (1991) stresses, they create order and reduce
uncertainty in exchange. Basically, institutions in°uence economic transac-
tions in three ways (World Bank (2002), 8): (1) They channel information
about market conditions, goods, and participants and thus help reduce in-
formation asymmetries. (2) They de¯ne and enforce property rights and









95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
Trade EU-15 - AC-12 Trade EU-15 - RoW
contracts, determining who gets what and when. Knowing one's rights to
assets and income and being able to protect those rights are essential for
market development. (3) They regulate competition in markets, which di-
rectly interacts with innovation and economic growth. Through these three
functions, well developed institutions help to decrease the transaction costs
for market participants, a®ect the distribution of assets, incomes and costs
as well as increase the e±ciency of markets. The quality of institutions is
generally assessed according to the degree they can guarantee these functions.
The role and importance of institutions with regard to growth and devel-
opment issues has been subject to a large body of empirical research. Poor
governance is maintained to bring about negative externalities for private
transactions, which raises transaction costs and ultimately generates nega-
tive e®ects on growth and development. In contrast, the protection of private
property rights, a reliable rule of law, and a stable government are found to
stimulate investment and thus enhance growth.1
1Empirical studies on the e®ect of institutions on aggregate income include Hall and
5Only lately has the link between institutions and trade become more
prominent in the empirical literature, acknowledging that there are more
barriers to trade than tari®s, quotas and distance. As a matter of fact, trans-
action costs between economic agents are often higher when doing business
with foreign countries than domestically due to higher insecurity and conse-
quently higher risk in exchange. Some studies explicitly analyze the in°uence
of institutions on trade in a gravity model context. Carrying out a case study
on the overseas Chinese network, Rauch and Trindade (2002) examine the
impact of informal transnational networks on bilateral trade and ¯nd a strong
positive network e®ect. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show how insecu-
rity of international exchange acts as a hidden tax on trade and conclude that
weak institutions, favoring corruption and imperfect contract enforcement,
signi¯cantly constrain trade. The positive in°uence of high-quality institu-
tions on bilateral trade °ows is also con¯rmed by Babetskaia-Kukharchuk
and Maurel (2004) and Jansen and Nordº as (2004). Furthermore, de Groot,
Linder, Rietveld, and Subramanian (2004) and Cheptea (2007) stress that an
institutional framework that is similar between countries promotes bilateral
trade.
In addressing the question whether trade between the old and the new
EU member countries will be fostered by a convergence in the institutional
framework, we ¯rst have to ascertain that membership in the EU indeed
positively in°uences the quality of institutions in the member countries. Fig-
ure 2 makes clear that the AC-12 have seen a large increase in institutional
freedom and that the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) slowly converges
towards the average of the EU-15.2
Can it rightfully be asserted that this convergence between the AC-12
and the EU-15 will be signi¯cantly enhanced by the accession to the EU,
or are there rather other forces at work in raising the institutional quality
Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Knack and Keefer (1995), and
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004). de Haan and Sturm (2001), using the Index of
Economic Freedom, ¯nd a positive relationship between economic freedom and economic
growth.
2See section 4 for details on the data.
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in the AC-12? In order to ¯nd out to what extent institutions explain the
magnitude and direction of bilateral trade °ows between the old and the new
EU members, we estimate the following stylized pooled OLS regression for
all countries included in our data base:
Xij = ® + ¯EUij + °INSTij + ²t (1)
Exports and imports between countries i and j (Xij) simply depend on
membership in the EU and the institutional variables from the IEF. The
EU dummy turns out to be highly signi¯cant and reaches a value of 0.202
for exports and 0.189 for imports (see Table 2). Omitting INSTij from the
equation, the parameter of the EU dummy would measure not only the ce-
teris paribus e®ect of EU membership on trade, but also the e®ect of EU
membership on trade including the e®ect of institutions. If EU membership
has indeed a positive e®ect on institutional quality as measured by INST, the
coe±cient of EU should become larger if INST was removed from the equa-
tion. The estimation results without institutions suggest that this is indeed
the case. Hence, we can conclude that institutional adjustments triggered
7Table 1: Institutions and EU integration
N with institutions without institutions
exports 109,365 0.202 (0.003) 0.359 (0.003)
imports 113,434 0.189 (0.003) 0.361 (0.003)
Notes: This table reports the value of the EU dummy (¯) from equation (1). p-values are
in parentheses.
by the accession should have an e®ect on foreign trade that goes beyond the
mere trade impact of the accession itself. The primacy of institutions is also
stressed by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) who ¯nd that when it
comes to economic development, institutions exert a much larger in°uence
than integration on the world economy or geographical characteristics.
3 Methodology and econometric issues
3.1 The gravity model
Over the last decades, the gravity model, based on Isaac Newton's law of
gravitation, has become a popular instrument in empirical international trade
analysis. Tinbergen (1962), PÄ oyhÄ onen (1963), and Linnemann (1966) were
among the ¯rst to explain the volume of bilateral trade °ows with gravity-
type models. In its basic form, the gravity equation relates bilateral trade
°ows to three fundamental determinants: (i) export supply, measured as in-
come of the exporting country,3 (ii) import demand, measured as income of
the importing country, and (iii) transaction costs, proxied by the geograph-
ical distance between the two countries. The such speci¯ed relationship has
provided very robust results in its empirical application.4
The basic gravity model can be re¯ned by taking into account various in-
°uences on transaction costs that go beyond the mere geographical distance.
3Apart from the national income, Bergstrand (1989) also employs GDP per capita to
capture the exporting country's capital-labor endowment ratio.
4In providing the theoretical foundations, Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Feen-
stra, Markusen, and Rose (2001), and Evenett and Keller (2002) reconciled the gravity
model with several trade theories.
8Factors generally found to promote bilateral trade are the membership in
regional trading blocs, a common border or ethnic and linguistic ties. Trade-
hampering factors, on the other hand, comprise direct policy instruments like
tari®s and quotas. More indirect obstacles to trade can further arise out of a
weak institutional framework, resulting in an imperfect enforcement of laws
and property rights, or the existence of corruption. As Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004) stress, policies in°uencing institutions are more important
than direct policy instruments in the determination of trade costs.
With the help of the gravity model the trade potential between countries
or regions can be analyzed. This line of research has become prominent in the
early nineties in dealing with the integration of the former Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) member countries into the international divi-
sion of labor. Empirical studies with emphasis on the future trade prospects
between the EU and selected former CMEA countries include Hamilton and
Winters (1992), Winters and Wang (1994), Baldwin (1994), Faini and Portes
(1995), and Christin (1996). The main results are that there exists a large un-
exploited trade potential originating from the transition process from planned
towards market economies. Assuming that the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean transition countries already behave more like market economies and
that the EU has by now established itself as their dominant trade partner,
a recent study by Papazoglou, Pentecost, and Marques (2006) estimates the
potential gains from trade from the Eastern expansion of the EU single mar-
ket. They conclude with an average rise in exports from the ten accession
countries to the EU-15 of 12.4 percent, whereas the accession economies' im-
ports from the EU-15 are expected to grow by 50.2 percent. Taking a more
critical standpoint, Gros and Gonciarz (1996), Breuss and Egger (1999) and
Piazolo (2001) argue that most of the trade potential might have already
been exploited. First of all, the trade liberalisation process between the EU
and the Central and Eastern European countries in line with the Europe
Agreements stimulated the rapid intensi¯cation of the trade relations. Sec-
ondly, from an econometric viewpoint Breuss and Egger (1999) cast doubts
on the reliability of results based on cross-section gravity empirics and con-
clude that they do not permit any de¯nite judgment as to whether actual
9East-West trade has already reached its potential level.
In order to calculate the trade potential, it is generally assumed that for-
eign trade between the Eastern and Western European countries will in the
medium term be subject to the same factors governing the trade relations
between countries already well integrated into the world trade system. By
means of the gravity model this benchmark trade intensity can be estimated.
The resulting parameters are then used to project the trade pattern between
the Eastern and Western European countries that would result if the bench-
mark coe±cients also held for the former Socialist countries. The excess of
the such calculated potential trade over actual trade can be interpreted as
an un-exhausted trade potential.
Our study builds upon this line of research with the focus on trade be-
tween the EU-15 and the AC-12. Hereby we assume that due to the trade
liberalization already accomplished all major trade obstacles have been re-
moved by now and that a future potential for trade can rather be realized
by adjustments in the new members' institutional environment towards the
EU-15 average. Furthermore, we explicitly distinguish between exports and
imports in order to analyze separately the forces behind the respective supply
and demand conditions.
3.2 Econometric issues
The question of the proper speci¯cation of the gravity model has been in-
creasingly discussed in the literature. In building a gravity model, speci¯-
cation errors can arise from various sides. On the one side, misspeci¯cation
can be a result of country heterogeneity and dynamics. On the other side, it
can be due to the exclusion or inclusion of speci¯c covariates. In aiming at a
proper speci¯cation, we closely follow Rose (2004) and estimate the following
10equation:
ln(Xijt) = ¯0 + ¯1 ln(GDPpcit) + ¯2 ln(GDPpcjt) + ¯3 ln(Distij) (2)










±kINSTkt + ¿t + ci + cj + cij + ²ijt;
where i and j denote trading partners, t is time, and Xijt are exports
respectively imports between country i and j at time t. GDPpc is GDP
per capita, Dist is the distance between i and j in km, EU and EMU
are binary variables that are unity if both trading partners are members
of the EU or the European Monetary Union (EMU), respectively. Border
is a binary variable that is unity if both trading partners share a common
border. Dummy represents further dummy variables as used in Rose (2004)
to control for as many other causes of trade as possible. INST comprises the
institutional variables. The parameters ¿t, ci, cj, cij denote time e®ects and
country e®ects, respectively, and ²ijt represents the omitted other in°uences
on bilateral trade.
Taking care of history has been increasingly discussed also with respect
to gravity models. While many studies used to be carried out with cross-
sectional estimation methods, Matyas (1997), Breuss and Egger (1999) and
Egger and Pfa®enmayr (2003) pointed out that the panel approach is a more
appropriate procedure. In general, both approaches are static and refer to
long-run relationships. The importance of dynamic gravity models was ¯rst
stressed by Eichengreen and Irwin (1997). Likewise, Bun and Klaassen (2002)
argue that trade history plays an important role in estimating gravity models
and that static models are misspeci¯ed. Enterprises in countries that have
long been involved in international trade have set up distributions and ser-
vice networks in the partner countries, which has led to low entrance and
exit barriers due to sunk costs. In addition, consumers have grown accus-
tomed to the partner countries' products. It is therefore very likely that
current bilateral trade between such countries is high because it has already
11been high in the past. Dynamic models in the gravity context have been
applied by De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000), Bun and Klaassen (2002), and
De Benedictis and Vicarelli (2005), who use their results to calculate trade
potentials.
Modeling dynamics in a panel data model with ¯xed e®ects is not straight-
forward. Consider the simple panel data model
Xijt = ¯0Xij;t¡1 + ¯i(Yijt) + ²ijt; (3)
where Yijt includes the explanatory variables from (2). The dynamic panel
data model cannot be consistently estimated with an OLS or a ¯xed-e®ects
(FE) estimator (or Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator) due
to the fact that the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error
term assuming a ¯nite time horizon and an in¯nite number of cross-section
observations.5 To avoid the inconsistency of the LSDV estimator, numerous
alternatives have been proposed, with the most popular class of the gener-
alized methods of moments (GMM) estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1995) have shown that
equation (3) can be consistently and e±ciently estimated by using ¯rst dif-
ferences and a system GMM estimation approach. The Arellano-Bond (AB)
estimator uses the lagged levels of the dependent variables as instruments.
The Blundell-Bond (BB) estimator utilizes the lagged levels as well as the
lagged di®erences of the explanatory variables, hereby allowing to use an
additional observation in time compared to the AB-estimator. Therefore,
the BB-method is more e±cient and less plagued by biases, also with re-
spect to small samples. The validity of instruments requires the absence of
second-order serial correlation in the residuals. Overall validity can also be
5In the ¯xed-e®ect case the bias disappears when the number of time periods and
observations is very large (see for instance Baltagi (2005)). De Grauwe and Skudelny
(2000) (T = 32, N = 156) and Bun and Klaassen (2002) (T = 48, N = 156) rely on this
argument in their gravity model estimations. Furthermore there is an ongoing discussion
about how large "very large" is (see, for example, Judson and Owen (1999)). Bun and
Klaassen (2002) show in a simulation study that LSDV is a serious alternative for the
estimation of dynamic gravity models when T increases. However, as our time period
from 1995 to 2004 is rather short we can not resort to this alternative.
12tested using a Sargan test (for the AB-estimator) or a Hansen test (for the
BB-estimator).
In our analysis we proceed in three steps. In order to compare our results
with those of earlier studies, we start with a simple pooled OLS regression
with robust standard errors. In a second step we run FE-panel regressions to
control for country-speci¯c e®ects. The FE model that is in most regression
speci¯cations preferable to the random-e®ects (RE) model (Egger (2002))
delivers the within-e®ects estimator and makes use of the time-varying com-
ponent of changes in the explanatory variables. The estimates of the FE-
model can therefore be interpreted as short-run e®ects of changes in exports
and are the relevant estimators for our data given the relative short time-
period utilized in the sample (see Mundlak (1978)).6 In addition to the static
analysis of our data, in a third step we estimate the in°uence of institutions
on trade with the help of dynamic panel data models and use both the AB-
as well as the BB-estimator.
4 The data
The quality of national institutions can be quanti¯ed with the help of various
measures. They all provide a systematic, empirical measurement of either
the competitiveness of countries or the main factors of economic growth and
prosperity and allow for a ranking of countries according to the quality of
their institutions.7 In line with Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004)
and Cheptea (2007) we resort to the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). It
was ¯rst published in 1995 by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street
Journal and o®ers on a yearly basis an examination of the factors that con-
tribute most directly to economic freedom and prosperity (Heritage Founda-
6The FE-estimator eliminates all time-invariant variables by the data transformation.
To overcome this problem, Hausman and Taylor (1981) propose an instrumental variable
estimator for panel data regression. This estimator was used by Babetskaia-Kukharchuk
and Maurel (2004) and Rault, Sova, and Sova (2008) in the gravity context. As we want
to focus on the (time varying) institutional variables, however, we leave out this estimator.
7Ochel and RÄ ohn (2006) provide an overview of various indices as well as a discussion
of the respective approaches and methodologies.
13tion (2008)). The index is computed as a simple average over ten individual
factors of economic freedom (see Table 2) for meanwhile 162 countries with
scores ranging from 0 to 100 and is available for each year from 1995 to 2008.8
The higher the score on a factor is, the higher the level of economic freedom
and hence the lower the level of government interference in the economy.
Since, as a rule, good market conditions and economic freedom are guar-
anteed by strong and independent institutions, the IEF can be viewed as a
measure of the quality of national institutions. Descriptive statistics on the
single factors of economic freedom for the EU-15 and the AC-12 are provided
in Table 3.
The database for our gravity model consists of a comprehensive sample
of 146 countries, which results in an average of twelve thousand observations
per year, excluding unobserved trade °ows between pairs of countries. This
large database enables us to get a clear picture on the general importance
of institutions for the direction and magnitude of foreign trade °ows.9 Our
analysis covers the years from 1995 to 2004. At the beginning of the 1990s
the trade pattern of the Central and Eastern European countries underwent
dramatic changes due to the economic breakdown after the fall of the Iron
Curtain, which strongly shows in the data before 1995. Furthermore, the
IEF starts in that year. Foreign trade data is obtained from the IMF's World
Trade Statistics and is de°ated by the American consumer price index for
all urban consumers in analogy to Rose (2004). Constant GDP (in 2000 US
dollars), GDP per capita, and population data are from the World Bank's
World Development Indicators. For the calculation of the distance between
the countries we refer to the distance in km between their capitals.10
8We do not consider Labor Freedom because of inconsistencies in the time series. In
the course of restructuring the IEF, the 2007 index adopted an independent labor freedom
factor that is designed to measure countries' labor market regulations more adequately
than the variable previously used. Since the old and the new factor di®er somewhat in
the calculation, we refrain from combining the old and the new factor.
9In this respect, we also follow the advice of Frankel (1997) to use as broad a set of
data as possible in order to ascertain how European links di®er from what is considered
normal. As a result, the present study is more comprehensive than most of the other
empirical studies working with gravity models. See Table 4 for an overview of the relevant
studies and the number of observations considered.
10www.indo.com/distance.
14Embedded in the framework of the gravity model, we use the IEF to
analyze the link between institutions and trade. To this end we do not select
only those factors that we a priori expect to have an impact on trade, but
include all nine institutional factors and let the econometric models decide
which of them are relevant for the explanation of bilateral trade °ows.
5 Results
5.1 Benchmark regressions
The general suitability of the gravity model for explaining the magnitude
and direction of foreign trade °ows is illustrated in Table 5 that contains the
benchmark estimation results for both exports and imports. For reasons of
clarity, we report only the coe±cients on the basic determinants of trade,
which are GDP per capita and distance. Furthermore, the estimated values
of the EU and EMU dummies are included in order to show the stimulus in
trade that membership in these regimes advances. The border dummy stands
for more general trade-enhancing factors arising out of proximity between two
countries.11
In a ¯rst step we estimate a simple pooled OLS model (column 1), assum-
ing that all explanatory variables are exogenous. However, as it is implausible
that there are no unobserved individual e®ects and to explicitly take into ac-
count time e®ects in a second step we estimate a panel model with random
and ¯xed e®ects. Since the Hausman test points towards a systematic dif-
ference in the coe±cients of the two methods the ¯xed-e®ects (FE) model is
given preference. Results are depicted in column 2. The regression results
yield the expected results for exports and for imports and are generally in
line with those of other studies. Countries with a higher per capita income
trade more, while trade decreases with the distance between them. In ad-
dition, being member in the EU or the EMU as well as sharing a common
border further stimulates foreign trade.12
11The detailed results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
12The coe±cients on EU and EMU are rather small when compared to other literature
15Results on the two dynamic panel speci¯cations are reported in column
3 for the Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator and in column 4 for the Blundell-
Bond (BB) estimator. The highly signi¯cant lagged values in both dynamic
panel estimations suggest a strong dynamic setup. This implies that the
previous time path of the explanatory variables, i.e. history, provides a good
explanation for the current value of foreign trade between countries (see also
Bun and Klaassen (2007), De Benedictis and Vicarelli (2005) and Moser,
Nestmann, and Wedow (2008)). However, the Hansen and Sargan tests are
signi¯cant at the 5 per cent level implying that the instruments are not
valid.13 Furthermore there is still second-order autocorrelation, suggesting
that a valid dynamic speci¯cation is not feasible for our data set. Apparently,
the combination of the relatively short time horizon with the large data
sample does not yield consistent results. This highlights the general problems
of modeling dynamic panel estimations in the gravity context.
5.2 The role of institutions
In this section we extend the benchmark analysis and focus on the in°uence
of institutions on bilateral trade. Tables 6 and 7 provide results of the gravity
model estimations with the inclusion of the factors of economic freedom. As
with the benchmark estimations, we run static and dynamic panel regressions
for exports and imports separately. Again, the lagged dependent values hint
towards a signi¯cant dynamic behavior, but the dynamic models are not
appropriate in terms of the validity of instruments. Hence, in the following
discussion, we again concentrate on the FE-estimation results. The basic
coe±cients are similar compared to the benchmark regressions, implying that
the fundamental relationships are stable when the institutional variables are
included.
Our results clearly con¯rm the importance of institutions for interna-
in this context (see Table 4 and Bun and Klaassen (2007)). This can largely be explained
with the large number of countries included in our dataset and the consideration of various
other regional free trade agreements so that the in°uence of EU or EMU membership might
be attenuated in this global perspective.
13In the export regressions of Egger (2000) the Sargan test is only marginally satis¯ed.
16tional trade, but not all of the considered institutional factors are signi¯cant.
What is more, not all coe±cients show the expected positive signs, suggest-
ing that in some economic areas, a higher level of government interference
in the economy along with less economic freedom might even be bene¯cial
in promoting foreign trade. Three of the nine institutional factors exert a
particularly large in°uence on trade, which we will discuss in more detail.
According to our results, the most important institutional factor for trade
is the role of the government within a country. The level of government ex-
penditures as a percentage of GDP captured by Government Size (Gov) is
highly signi¯cant and negative both for exports and imports, supporting the
view that high government spending fosters trade. This ¯nding might at
¯rst sight be surprising, given that it does not adhere to concrete aspects
of institutional quality. Rather more elementary, the role of government in
the economy can be interpreted as the way countries deal with risk ema-
nating from turbulence in the world markets. Rodrik (1998) brings forward
this argument in presenting a robust positive association between an econ-
omy's exposure to foreign trade and the size of its government. More open
economies have a greater exposure to external risk emerging from insecurity
in international relations. Larger government spending in such economies
can be regarded as providing social insurance insofar as the government is
a "safe" sector in terms of employment and purchases from the rest of the
economy compared to the sector producing tradeable goods. Hence, in open
economies the government can reduce risk going along with trading with
other countries by taking command of a larger share of the economy's re-
sources. Likewise, Bates, Brock, and Tiefenthaler (1991) emphasize that
governments can respond to the risks engendered by international exposure
either with protectionism or with domestic forms of insurance, i.e. welfare
and transfer payments. Hence, government expenditures can not only be seen
as distorting market outcomes, but also under the aspect of providing insur-
ance against external risk. This explanation is corroborated by the IEF data.
The large open economies of the world tend to have smaller values for Gov,
implying that government expenditures are relatively high in comparison to
17GDP.14
Second, the degree of banking security and independence from govern-
ment control (Fin) also signi¯cantly in°uences trade relations between coun-
tries. However, the signs di®er for the exporting and the importing countries.
Since a company involved in imports from a foreign country has to be able to
meet the accounts and to have access to sound credits and foreign currency,
free access to credit and ¯nance is likely to be of greater importance for the
importing country j than for the exporting country i. This might explain
the positive coe±cients for the importing country j. The negative values for
the exporting country i can be interpreted in the sense that a prudential
state supervision of banks and other ¯nancial services also guarantees reli-
able ¯nancing options for companies. Moser, Nestmann, and Wedow (2008),
for example, ¯nd evidence for the case of Germany that o±cial credit guar-
antees against export risks are indeed able to foster exports. Like for Gov,
this explanation addresses the active role government can play in regulat-
ing economic transactions and in providing an insurance mechanism against
external risk.
The third institutional factor that exerts a signi¯cant impact on trade is
the level of corruption (Cor). A low level of corruption fosters exports, which
is in line with results of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Babetskaia-
Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004). In contrast, a high level of corruption goes
hand in hand with increasing import demand. This apparently paradox ¯nd-
ing can be explained twofold. The ¯rst argument concerns the relationship
between trade intensity, respectively country size, and corruption. Many
studies conclude that higher trade intensity and/or small populations are as-
sociated with lower corruption levels. Knack and Azfar (2003) demonstrate
that these relationships are largely an artefact of sample selection bias, be-
cause often small nations that are not so well governed are not included in the
analyses. Since these nations are also included in our database, this can serve
as one explanation for our ¯ndings.15 Further reinforcing the sample selec-
14Closely connected with Gov is the concept of ¯scal freedom (Fiscal), which measures
the activity of governments in generating revenue for themselves by raising taxes. However,
this institutional factor is less signi¯cant and does not show consistent signs.
15The coe±cients on corruption become positive and signi¯cant when only the OECD
18tion bias, trade with corrupt countries can also be stimulated if it is expected
to generate pro¯ts that compensate the accompanying risks. For example,
this can be the case for trade with natural resources. A second argument
deals with the connection between rapid political and trade liberalizations
and corruption. Tavares (2007) investigates the relationship between cor-
ruption and reforms, distinguishing between political and economic reforms.
She ¯nds that undertaking both kinds of reforms in rapid succession leads
to a decrease in corruption, whereas countries that liberalized more than
5 years after democratizing experienced an increase in corruption. Hence,
an increase in the overall institutional framework can well go along with
increasing corruption.
Compared to these three institutional factors, we ¯nd a considerably lower
in°uence of the other factors of economic freedom. The e®ects of free trade
agreements on trade °ows are mainly captured by the dummies included in
the regression. Hence, the extent of tari® and non-tari® barriers to trade
(Trade) becomes signi¯cant only for import °ows, suggesting that only those
factors unaccounted for by the dummies appear. As can be expected, low
barriers in country i are conducive to imports. Likewise, the variable on
restrictions on foreign and internal investment (Inv) is signi¯cant only for
import °ows. High restrictions on investment in the importing country foster
imports, which can be interpreted as substituting for the lacking possibility
to carry out foreign direct investment. Monetary institutions managing to
hold in°ation low and preventing price controls (Mon) also act positively
upon exports. Business freedom (Bus) and property rights (PR), ¯nally, are
of minor relevance for bilateral trade.
5.3 The potential for trade between the EU-15 and the
AC-12
The regression results discussed above present clear evidence on the role of
institutions for bilateral trade relations. We can now apply these ¯ndings
countries are included in the regression. As to be expected, then, a low level of corruption
is conducive to the volume of international trade.
19on our initial question of how trade between the old and the new EU mem-
bers will be a®ected by a change in the AC-12's institutions in the process
of EU enlargement. As section 2 has shown, the twelve accession countries
on average still lag considerably behind the old EU members in spite of the
convergence process that has already taken place. Further improving the
institutional quality in the AC-12 in accordance with the Acquis Commu-
nautaire implies an additional potential for increasing trade between the old
and the new EU member states. To assess this trade potential, we assume
that the accession to the EU will result in a convergence of the AC-12's insti-
tutional scores towards the level of the old EU member states. This implies,
for example, that the value for freedom from corruption (Cor) in the AC-12
will rise from 42.9 towards the EU 15-level of 75.5 (see Table 3). On the other
hand, it can be expected that the new EU member countries will experience
an increase in the size of their governments, which would result in a decrease
of their average value for Gov of 46.3 to the EU-15 average of 27.8.16 Since,
according to our estimation results, lower values of Gov give rise to trade ex-
pansion, this decrease should result in a higher trade volume between the two
blocks of countries that we measure in logarithms as ¢lnXij. The algebraic
calculation of the trade potential is straightforward
¢lnXij = ^ ®j(INSTi ¡ INSTj); (4)
where ^ ®j represents the coe±cient of the respective institutional factor of
Economic Freedom estimated with the FE-model for exports and for imports.
INSTi stands for the score in the year 2004 for the EU-15 and INSTj for
the ten countries having joined the EU in 2004, whereas for Bulgaria and
Romania we choose the scores in 2006.
Table 8 illustrates the potential for trade for each institutional factor.
Exports from the old to the new members a well as the old members' im-
ports from the new ones are considered separately. The largest impulse for
exports from the EU-15 to the new member states comes from diminishing
16The development of public expenditures in the countries entering the EU in prior
enlargement rounds is quite instructive in this respect. See Maravall (1993) for an account
on Spain.
20di®erences in government size. It is driven by the high relevance of this in-
stitutional factor that has become visible in the regression results combined
with the still notedly lower share of government expenditures in the AC-12.
On the other hand, imports from the AC-12, i.e. exports from the new to
the old EU members, could be most e®ectively fostered by the ¯ght against
corruption in the AC-12. Here the di®erences between the old and the new
EU countries are still largest. Accordingly, successfully reducing corruption
might ceteris paribus give way to higher trade. Furthermore, the high rele-
vance of Financial Freedom for bilateral trade °ows entails a large additional
gain from trade, although the di®erences between the old and the new EU
member countries are not very large in this respect.17
Table 9 presents the calculations on the trade potential for each pair of
countries individually over all signi¯cant institutional factors.18 As the last
column shows, exports from the old EU countries could increase between
2.6% in the case of Spain and 11.3% in the case of Denmark. Exports from
the AC-12 to the EU-15 are estimated to increase between 0.6% from Malta
and 2.6% from Bulgaria. Overall, exports from the old to the new EU member
states could additionally increase by 5.7% and imports by 17.9% because of
a convergence in the AC-12's institutions towards the average of the EU-15.
6 Summary
This paper presents evidence on additional gains from trade between the 15
old EU countries and the 12 new members having joined the EU in 2004 and
2007 that result from the convergence of the AC-12's institutional environ-
ment towards the standard of the EU-15. We resort to the gravity model
for the calculation of potential export and import °ows and focus on the
17Also based on the IEF, Cheptea (2007) con¯rms the importance of ¯ghting corruption
in the AC-12. Her conclusions regarding the other components of the IEF, however,
depart from our results, what might be due to di®erences in the country samples and
methodologies applied.
18In calculating the potential rise in trade °ows, we look at each pair of countries
separately and assume that the value of the new member's institutional factor will reach
that of the old EU member country.
21role institutions play for international trade. Our estimates are based on a
large panel data set of 142 countries and ten years. Augmenting the gravity
model by detailed institutional variables from the Index of Economic Free-
dom clearly shows that institutions do matter for foreign trade. Above all,
our results highlight the positive role government can play in minimizing
risk that goes along with trade openness. Large government spending can
in this sense be regarded as providing social insurance against external risk
by means of comparably safe employment or transfer payments. In addi-
tion, a prudential state supervision of banks and other ¯nancial services can
guarantee reliable ¯nancing mechanisms for enterprises that are involved in
international trade. Exports are further fostered by the ¯ght against corrup-
tion. Besides, the dynamic panel regressions provide evidence that history
plays a role in explaining current trade °ows, which also alludes to the in°u-
ence of the institutional quality that was obtained in the past.
Having determined the relevance and the in°uence institutions exert on
trade, we can calculate the potential for trade expansion that results from the
further convergence of the institutional framework between the old and the
new EU member countries in accordance with the Acquis Communautaire.
Exports from the EU-15 to the AC-12 would be particularly stimulated by a
growing government sector in the new members, while imports into the EU-
15 would gain most from the ¯ght against corruption in the AC-12. Here the
di®erences between the old and the new EU members are most pronounced.
On the whole, we can conclude that exports from the old to the new EU
countries could experience an additional impulse of 5.7% and imports of
17.9% if the institutional framework in the AC-12 was adjusted to the average
of the old member states of the EU.
Lastly, two restrictions on our ¯ndings are in order. The gravity model
does not provide information on how much time it will take until the trade
potential can be realized. Since the AC-12's institutional environment is not
expected to converge immediately towards the EU level, it would be plausible
to say that the calculated trade potential could be gained in the medium to
long run. Another more general aspect concerns the formulation of policy
recommendations on the basis of qualitative indices measuring the quality of
22institutions. We have provided evidence on the role of speci¯c institutions
for trade and the impact on trade between the old and the new EU members
if the AC-12 induced a change in their institutional environment. We cannot,
however, furnish information on the precise measures that should be taken
in order to induce a change in the corresponding index values. This question
is left to further research.
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29Table 2: The factors of economic freedom
Factor of economic freedom Description
Business Freedom (Bus) Quick and easy creation, operation and
closing of an enterprise
Trade Freedom (Trade) Tari® and non-tari® barriers
Fiscal Freedom (Fiscal) Tax burden, tax revenue
Government Size (Gov) Government expenditures
Monetary Freedom (Mon) Price stability and price controls
Investment Freedom (Inv) Free °ow of (foreign) capital
Financial Freedom (Fin) Banking security and independence from
government control
Property Rights (PR) Ability of individuals to accumulate pri-
vate property
Freedom from Corruption (Cor) Perception of corruption in the business en-
vironment
Labor Freedom Ability of workers and businesses to inter-
act without restriction by the state
Source: Heritage Foundation (2008).
30Table 3: Institutional Factors: Descriptive Statistics (average values over the
years 1995 to 2004)
Highest Average EU-15 Average AC-12 Lowest
Overall Score 77.2 (GB) 67.7 61.0 49.6 (RO)
Business Freedom 88.3 (DK) 75.4 72.4 55.0 (BG)
Trade Freedom 81.6 (EST) 78.5 71.7 60.3 (BG)
Fiscal Freedom 77.8 (LV) 47.0 64.4 31.5 (DK)
Gov't Size 65.8 (LT) 27.8 46.3 0.8 (S)
Monetary Freedom 90.0 (DK) 84.2 64.5 36.4 (RO)
Investment Freedom 90.0 (EST) 71.4 65.6 52.0 (F)
Financial Freedom 90.0 (NL)* 67.6 62.8 38.0 (GR)
Property Rights 90.0 (A)** 82.1 58.8 30.0 (RO)
Freedom from Corruption 96.0 (DK) 75.5 42.9 28.0 (M)
Notes: *: also GB, CZ. **: also B, DK, FIN, D, IRL, L, NL, GB.
Source: Heritage Foundation, authors' own calculations.
Table 4: Literature review: Sample size and EU estimates
Time period N EU
Hamilton and Winters (1992) 1984-1986 4,320 0.70
Baldwin (1994) 1979-1984 3,390 -
Breuss and Egger (1999) 1990-1994 506 0.42
Bun and Klaassen (2002) 1950-1997 10,608 -
Badinger and Breuss (2004) 1960-2000 1,456 -
Rose (2004) 1948-1999 234,597 1.2a
Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004) 1994-2001 13,712 0.17
de Groot, Linder, Rietveld, and Subramanian (2004) 1998 9,006 0.87a
De Benedictis and Vicarelli (2005) 1991-2000 3,347 0.240a
Papazoglou, Pentecost, and Marques (2006) 1992-2003 4,157 0.287
Cheptea (2007) 1993-2000 1,356 -
Notes: a: Regional Free Trade Agreements.
31Table 5: Benchmark results - exports and imports
Exports
OLS FE AB BB
Xijt-1 0:220*** 0:244***
GDPpci 0:541*** 0:369* 0:227* 0:513***
GDPpcj 0:408*** 0:581* 0:458*** 0:407***
distance ¡0:092*** 0:000 ¡0:120***
EU 0:017*** ¡0:002*** ¡0:042***
EMU 0:014*** ¡0:002 0:001 0:031***




N 109,365 109,365 75,379 90,676
Imports
OLS FE AB BB
Xijt-1 0:201*** 0:261***
GDPpci 0:410*** 0:678*** 0:515*** 0:394***
GDPpcj 0:572*** 0:412*** ¡0:112 0:501***
distance ¡0:092*** ¡0:001*** ¡0:109***
EU 0:007*** ¡0:003*** ¡0:041***
EMU 0:013*** 0:000 0:001* 0:027***




N 113,434 113,434 78,706 94,589
Notes: Regressand: log exports and log imports, respectively. Intercept, further
dummies from equation (1) and time dummies included but not reported. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤,
indicate signi¯cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. OLS = pooled OLS, FE = ¯xed
e®ects, AB = Arellano Bond, BB = Blundell Bond.
32Table 6: Estimation results with institutional variables - exports
OLS FE AA BB
Xij,t-1 0:226*** 0:317***
GDPpci 0:502*** 0:366*** 0:122*** 0:324***
GDPpcj 0:398*** 0:568*** 1:597*** 0:265***
distance ¡0:097*** ¡0:001*** ¡0:062***
EU 0:020*** ¡0:002*** 0:016***
EMU 0:002 0:000 0:000** 0:002
Border 0:062 0:000 0:038***
Busi 0:000 ¡0:094* 0:092 ¡0:120*
Busj 0:179*** ¡0:015 0:059 ¡0:055
Tradei 0:476*** ¡0:027 0:034 0:183***
Tradej 0:548*** 0:042 0:014 0:239***
Fiscali ¡0:476*** ¡0:005 ¡0:344*** ¡0:077
Fiscalj 0:343*** 0:134* 0:149 0:259***
Govi 0:975*** ¡0:296*** 0:028 0:398***
Govj 0:629*** ¡0:126*** ¡0:049 0:321***
Moni ¡0:931*** 0:108*** ¡0:106** ¡0:431***
Monj ¡0:188*** ¡0:037 ¡0:111** ¡0:086*
Invi 0:535*** 0:006 0:035 0:371***
Invj 0:213*** 0:000 0:084 0:208***
Fini ¡0:300*** ¡0:097*** 0:004 ¡0:293***
Finj 0:051 0:249*** 0:088 0:034
PRi 0:376*** 0:114** ¡0:027 0:350***
PRj ¡0:003 0:056 0:083 0:073
Cori 0:740*** 0:186** 0:046 0:315***




N 109,365 109,365 75,379 90,676
Notes: Regressand: log exports. Intercept, further dummies from equation (1) and
time dummies included but not reported. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤, indicate signi¯cance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively. OLS = pooled OLS, FE = ¯xed e®ects, AB = Arellano Bond, BB
= Blundell Bond. Institutional coe±cients are multiplied by 1000.
33Table 7: Estimation results with institutional variables - imports
OLS FE AA BB
Xij,t-1 0:238*** 0:335***
GDPpci 0:392*** 0:657*** 1:757*** 0:256***
GDPpcj 0:553*** 0:446*** ¡0:665*** 0:342***
distance ¡0:096*** ¡0:001** ¡0:061***
EU 0:013*** ¡0:003*** 0:012***
EMU 0:000 0:001 0:000*** 0:002
Border 0:058*** ¡0:001 0:032***
Busi 0:341*** 0:079 0:108 0:117
Busj ¡0:093 ¡0:202*** ¡0:182** ¡0:115
Tradei 0:736*** 0:118*** 0:109** 0:255***
Tradej 0:414*** ¡0:179*** ¡0:156*** 0:163***
Fiscali 0:367*** 0:175** 0:236** 0:294***
Fiscalj ¡0:414*** ¡0:140* ¡0:415*** ¡0:124
Govi 0:316*** ¡0:130*** ¡0:216*** 0:153***
Govj 1:345*** ¡0:143*** 0:071 0:610***
Moni ¡0:349*** ¡0:029 ¡0:119** ¡0:229***
Monj ¡0:806*** 0:120*** ¡0:135** ¡0:365***
Invi ¡0:009 ¡0:088* ¡0:095 0:072
Invj 0:904*** 0:108** 0:091 0:484***
Fini ¡0:116*** 0:253*** ¡0:016 ¡0:102***
Finj ¡0:190*** ¡0:277*** ¡0:053 ¡0:203***
PRi 0:257*** 0:038 0:135 0:208***
PRj ¡0:031 0:074 ¡0:038 0:180**
Cori 0:003 ¡0:195*** ¡0:087* ¡0:005




N 113,434 113,434 78,706 94,589
Notes: Regressand: log imports. Intercept, further dummies from equation (1) and
time dummies included but not reported. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤, indicate signi¯cance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively. OLS = pooled OLS, FE = ¯xed e®ects, AB = Arellano Bond, BB
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